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Abstract:  We examine the response of a sticky-wage economy to various real and 
nominal shocks.  In addition to variations in hours, we allow for an endogenous response 
in worker effort per hour.  Despite wages being predetermined, the labor market clears 
through the effort margin.  We find that the ability of a sticky-wage model to mimic U.S. 
business cycles is much improved by allowing for reasonable effort movements.  The 
model also provides a ready explanation for the finding that TFP is negatively affected by 
nominal shocks. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
There is an immense literature on the impact of nominal wage rigidities.  This 
literature is partly motivated by the large numbers of workers whose wage rates are 
updated to reflect economic news, including inflation, only at intervals of a year or longer.  
It is also partly motivated as a way to explain why purely monetary shocks can create 
important fluctuations in hours and output.   
In Bils and Chang (2000) we point out, however, that the predictions of sticky-
wage models rely critically, not only on wages being predetermined, but also on an implicit 
assumption that neither firms nor workers can adjust the intensity of workers’ effort.  
Figure 1 illustrates this.  In the standard treatment of sticky wages, an unexpectedly low 
price, given a sticky nominal wage, causes the market to move from point E to E¢, with 
labor supply exceeding labor demand.  This causes firms to cut back on hours until this 
reduction is sufficient to drive the marginal product of labor up to the level of the "too 
high" real wage.  But note that at point E¢  it is clearly profitable for firms to ask more of 
workers in terms of effort or exertion.  If firms ask more of workers this shifts the demand 
for hours of labor upward.  It also shifts the labor supply curve upward reflecting the 
greater cost to workers of each hour at the higher effort.  Firms can ask more of workers 
up to the point that work intensity justifies the “too high” real wage at a point like E†.  
Given the upward shift in labor demand, hours are reduced by less than at E¢.  Note that 
the labor market still clears, despite the sticky wage, thanks to the effort margin.  We find 
that this response greatly reduces the welfare costs of specifying wages in advance in the 
face of monetary shocks.  We argue that perhaps this helps to justify why firms and 
workers appear willing to trade under a sticky wage. 
Here we ask a more ambitious question: Does a model with sticky wages and an 
effort response help for understanding business cycle fluctuations?  To answer this 
question, we compare the model quantitatively to models both with flexible and sticky 
wages, but no effort margin.   
The next section presents a general equilibrium model that incorporates the 
endogenous effort response just described.  Under sticky wages workers must produce   2
enough to merit the specified wage to maintain employment.  Section 3 quantifies the 
model for empirical purposes.  The model economy is calibrated and stochastic 
disturbances to the economy in technology, preference, and money growth, are 
considered.  We estimate the disturbance process three ways to be consistent three types 
of labor market arrangement--flexible wages, sticky wages, and finally sticky wages with 
an endogenous effort.  Section 4 examines the model responses for hours, output, and 
productivity to the business cycle shocks.  
We find that allowing for a response in effort dramatically improves the ability of a 
sticky-wage model to mimic U.S. business cycles.  Fluctuations in hours are much more 
persistent and the correlation between fluctuations in hours and labor productivity is much 
closer to that observed in the data.  Compared with flexible wages, the model with sticky 
wages and an effort response is more successful in generating increases in productivity in 
advance of increases in hours worked.  For U.S. data, fluctuations in real wages, labor 
productivity, and TFP all dramatically lead those in hours.  Furthermore, the model with 
sticky-wages and varying effort is the only one that generates a decline in TFP in response 
to a positive nominal shock, as we estimate for U.S. data. 
 
 
2.   Model 
 
Consumers:   
There are a large number of identical infinitely lived consumers in the economy.  
At time t, the representative consumer maximizes expected discounted utility defined over 
a stream of effective consumption, xt.   
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Et is the expectations operator; the discount factor is b.  Following Becker (1965), 
consumption activity requires an input of time as well as goods.  More exactly, effective   3
consumption reflects commodities ct, real balances mt/Pt and effective labor spent on 
consumption activities  t l
~
.  We assume the utility function reflects the following relations. 
 
  t t x x u log ) ( =  
    
~1 t t
t t t l z x






] ) )( 1 ( [ -
- -
- + = u
u





c z . 
 
Shifts in preferences occur through variations in qt.  An increase in qt represents increased 
importance of purchased inputs relative to time in producing effective consumption.   
Goods and real money balances combine through a CES function with substitution 
elasticity u.  This yields a demand for real balances with elasticity of 1 with respect to 
consumption and -u with respect to the nominal interest rate.  We can conveniently draw 
upon a large empirical literature in calibrating a value for u. 
The distinctive feature of our model is that the effective amount of labor supplied 
to the market and to home consumption depends not only on how hours are split between 
market and home, but also on levels of exertion or effort.
1  Suppose the consumer spends 
an amount of time nt in the market and 1- nt at home for consuming.  Let ft and  t f
~
 
represent the effort levels he exerts at work and in the activity of consuming.  Then we 
treat effective labor in the market lt and effective time in consumption  t l
~
 as  
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where both g and l are > 0 and < 1. 
                                                 
1 Other papers that examine labor-market issues by exploiting the hours/effort tradeoff include Becker 
(1985), Oi (1990), Hartley (1992), and Leamer (1996).   4
We impose a constraint on the available energy that a consumer can exert in 
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If the consumer works more intensely in the market, he is left with less energy for non-
market activities.  (Becker, 1985, introduces this constraint.)  More generally, we can 
envision a number of ways in which consumers can potentially show themselves to be 
more desirable employees.  For instance workers could reduce absenteeism at the cost of 
less flexibility to stay at home on days they deem that as attractive.  
The consumer spends his money income for purchases of consumption goods ct, 
investment it, and money holdings mt.  Income includes labor income, rental income and a 
cash transfer from the government.  Given the nominal wage rate Wt, rental rate Rt, price 
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The money transfer from the government reflects the income from money creation.  






t m .  Capital depreciates at rate d. 
 The effective labor of a worker is 
g ft t n .  Therefore, to be employed, the worker 
has to provide an effort dictated by  
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t W  is the market’s valuation of labor, the marginal product of efficiency unit of labor, 
determined in general equilibrium as described below.  Under sticky wages the worker   5
takes not only Wt but also the real wage as given.  So the choice of effort is constrained, 
much as hours are constrained in a standard sticky wage model.  Here, by working hard 
enough, workers maintain the choice of hours.
2  In fact, even though the wage is sticky the 
labor market continues to clear.  (Recall Figure 1.)  
Consumer maximization yields a static first-order condition for choosing hours 
worked and two dynamic first-order conditions for choosing investment in capital and 
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t t c c  is consumption magnified by a factor equal to one plus the 
foregone interest cost of real balances held per unit of consumption.  
 
Firms: 
There are a large number of identical firms.  Each firm hires capital and labor to 
maximize profits  ) ( t t t t t t K R N W Y P - -  subject to the production function 
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2 This might appear to require that firms have very accurate measures of effort or performance.  But even 
if firms have only very imperfect measures, the essence of the argument applies.  If the wage is 
predetermined at a level that is too high, ex post, the firm can raise threshold levels of measured 
performance required for retention or promotion. 
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), replacing the constraint in (4).   6
 
This technology exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and effective labor.  Ft 
represents the aggregate effort level; At reflects temporary productivity shifts, whereas Qt 
reflects a deterministic trend of technology that grows at rate g .   
 The first order conditions for capital and labor are 
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The wage rates for workers must be specified a period in advance—this is the 
source of wage stickiness.  The wage is chosen to minimize the expected cost of labor in 
efficiency units, recognizing that the wage dictates the level of effort that firms can 







































To illustrate the logic of this choice, consider the case of no uncertainty.  In this case (11), 
together with equations (1) and (5), results in a wage, Wt+1, that delivers effort at work 














- .  This effort ratio, in turn, corresponds to the 
optimal effort choices under flexible wages.  (See Bils and Chang, 2000, for more detail.) 
 
Rational Expectations Equilibrium:  
The markets for goods, labor, and money clear each period.  A rational 
expectations equilibrium is a set of stochastic processes for the endogenous variables 
} , , , , , , , , { t t t t t t t t t R W P m c N K Y f  that satisfies (3)-(7), (9)-(11), and market clearing given   7
the exogenous stochastic processes  } , , { t t t A m q .  The model is solved numerically using a 
log-linear approximation of the system of first order conditions and constraints of the 
stationary economy around the steady state as in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988.)
 4 
 
3. Calibration of Model Parameters and Shocks 
 
Calibration of Model Parameters: 
In our model the labor market clears, despite short-run wage stickiness, thanks to 
fluctuations in market effort.  Consequently, the model’s predictions for fluctuations in 
hours and output depend not only on the conventional elasticity of labor supply, but also 
on how desired hours are affected by these fluctuations in effort.  Key parameters are g 
and l, which dictate the willingness of workers to trade off exertion and hours in 
production and consumption.  As an example, in the limit as g and l approach one hours 
and effort are perfect substitutes.  Consider a nominal shock that drives up the real wage 
and effort by one percent.  Workers’ hours simply decrease by one percent, holding output 
(and welfare) constant.  More generally, however, the increase in real wage and effort 
leads to a lesser decrease in hours, an increase in output, and a fall in effective leisure  t l
~
.   
We use the values g  = 1/3 and l = 1/4.  Detailed explanations for these choices 
are provided in Bils and Chang (2000).  We calibrate the value for g based primarily on 
World War II evidence on how piece-rate workers responded in work efficiency to large 
swings in their weekly hours of work.  We set the ratio of exertion at work to exertion at 
home on the steady-state growth path, 
f
f
~ , equal to 3/2.  Given a value for g this dictates 
l’s value, as 
f
f






- .  (We also explore 
robustness to a range of values for parameters g and l.) 
                                                 
4 Given the existence of trends in technology and the money supply, we need to transform the economy so 
that it admits a stationary solution.  We can do so by dividing real variables by the technology index and 
nominal variables by the previous period’s money stock.  (To save on notation, we use the same variables 
for the transformed stationary variables.)   8
Let x denote the elasticity response of hours to the real wage holding current 
consumption expenditures constant.  The model implies an elasticity of one for (1-n) with 
respect to the wage. Therefore it implies a value of approximately  n
n - 1  for x.  We set the 
compensated elasticity of labor supply, x, equal to one by choosing parameters that yield 
steady-state n equal to one half.  This value for x is considerably lower than what is 
typically employed in simulations of real business cycles, but is quite large relative to most 
estimates from cross-sectional and panel data (Ghez and Becker, 1975, MaCurdy, 1981, 
and Altonji, 1986).
5   
First-order conditions (6) and (7) imply that money demand is proportional to 
consumption and has an interest rate elasticity of -u.  There is a very large empirical 
literature estimating u.  We take u = 0.1 as a reasonable value given the range of estimates 
(e.g., Laidler, 1985).  We set the parameter c equal to .9999.  For a value of 0.1 for u and 
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m  renders the effect of real balances on 
consumption demand nearly zero. 
We use standard values for other parameters such as the depreciation rate d, 
labor’s share a, the discount factor b, and the growth rate of technological progress g.  A 
steady-state value for the preference parameter q is dictated by the other parameters. 
Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices. 
 
Estimating the Stochastic Processes for Shocks:   
                                                 
5 Several studies have examined how time is divided between market and non-market pursuits based on 
time use diaries.  (Examples include Hill, 1983, Juster and Stafford, 1985, 1991.)  From Juster and 
Stafford (1991), a sample of men in the United States in 1981 report spending 48 hours per week in 
market work, including commuting, and 42 hours in social entertainment and various sorts of passive and 
active leisure.  For women the comparable number of hours are respectively 26 and 42.  These numbers 
suggest a value for  n
n - 1 of one or perhaps somewhat larger.   9
Three disturbances to the economy are considered: disturbances to technology At, 
to preferences qt, and to the rate of money growth mt.  We denote a variable’s percentage 
deviation from its steady-state value by adding a circumflex [e.g.  ) / log( ˆ A A A t t = ].
6  We 
assume that  ] ˆ   ˆ   ˆ [ t t t t A S m q =  reflects a stationary stochastic process,   
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We estimate this process three ways to be consistent first with a model with flexible wages 
and constant effort, then with a model with sticky wages and constant effort, and finally 
with a model with sticky wages and an effort response. 
 With constant effort we can measure shifts in productivity  t A ˆ  in a conventional 
manner using the Solow residual.  But more generally the Solow residual reflects 
variations in effort 
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To adjust for effort variations, we exploit the fact that  t t E f ˆ
1 - can be directly related to 
t t n E ˆ 1 -  given the wage setting in equation (11), constraint (1), and first-order condition 
(5).  After subtracting  ] ˆ [ 1 t t E f ag -  from the Solow residual for t, we project what remains 
on lagged and predetermined variables to construct the variable  t t A E ˆ
1 - .  (This is described 
in greater detail in the Appendix.)  Then, given that  t t A E ˆ
1 -  has the same autocorrelation 
as t A ˆ , we use the series for  t t A E ˆ
1 -  to estimate  A r . 
                                                 
6 For the rate of money growth  t m ˆ  denotes an absolute, rather than percentage, deviation.   10

















q .  This parallels Hall (1986), Parkin (1988), and Baxter and King’s 
(1991) use of the static first-order condition to measure preference shocks.  If wages are 
sticky this relationship holds only in expectation as of t-1.  As in the treatment of  t A ˆ , we 
first use this relationship to construct  t t E q ˆ
1 - , then estimate q r  from its autocorrelation.  
Lastly, we need to calibrate the stochastic process of monetary shocks.  Our 
reading of the literature provides no consensus on an appropriate measure of monetary 
shocks.  Short of such a measure, we proceed as follows to construct a measure of money 
growth that is consistent with our model.  The money demand equation requires that 
nominal money holdings be proportional to nominal expenditures on consumption and 
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Taking first differences and employing a value for u of .1, this yields a measure of 
disturbances to the rate of growth in money.  A potential problem with this measure is 
that, if we are incorrect in assuming elasticities of money demand of 1 and -.1 with 
respect to nominal consumption and nominal interest rates, then our measure of nominal 
shocks will be correlated spuriously with spending and interest rates.  To mitigate this 
problem, we first instrument for this measure of monetary disturbances by projecting on 
arguably exogenous components of monetary policy.  Specifically, we use innovations to 
monetary policy, suggested by Strongin (1995), and their lagged variables, which are 
identified from a VAR of total reserves, the ratio of non-borrowed reserves to total 
reserves, and the federal funds rate as instruments.  We will refer to the resulting series as 
our instrumented monetary shocks.  Estimation of the three shocks, with results, is 
described in greater detail in an appendix.  
   11
4. Results for Cyclical Fluctuations 
 
The cyclical behavior of hours and productivity 
 We contrast three models with respect to their predictions for how output, 
consumption, investment, productivity, and prices respond to shocks.  The models being: 
a standard flexible wage model, a model with sticky nominal wages and rationing in the 
labor market, and the model we have introduced with sticky nominal wages where the 
labor market clears through endogenous effort.  First, however, we examine the behavior 
of these variables for the U.S. economy with a particular emphasis on the cyclical behavior 
of productivity. 
 Table 2 presents the standard deviations, first-order autocorrelations, and 
contemporaneous correlations with real GDP for the eight series real GDP, consumption, 
investment, hours, prices, real wage, labor productivity, and the Solow residual (TFP) for 
the U.S. economy.  The series are annual Hodrick-Prescott filtered data for 1954-1996.  
Prices and the real wage reflect the GDP deflator.  The hours series are from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and reflect a correction for changes in the composition of the 
workforce by age and education.
7  The series for the real wage, labor productivity, and 
TFP are corrected in a consistent manner.  As has been often documented, variability of 
hours is nearly as large as that in output, with the standard deviation in the real wage and 
labor productivity less than half that of hours.  Note that fluctuations in hours are actually 
more persistent than fluctuations in labor productivity or TFP, in contrast to typical results 
for models that have been calibrated.  Prices are very countercyclical for the period 1954 
to 1996, with a correlation of -.57 with output. 
 Table 3 presents correlations of the real wage, labor productivity, and the Solow 
residual with hours contemporaneously as well as for leads and lags of up to 3 years.  Real 
wages and TFP exhibit contemporaneously correlations of .43 and .45 with hours, but 
labor productivity and hours are largely uncorrelated.  Fluctuations in all three variables 
                                                 
7 The adjustments for labor force composition are described in detail in BLS (1993).  Without correcting 
the standard deviation of hours is 2.19 percent instead of 2.01 percent.  Without correcting the 
correlations of labor productivity with output and hours equal .30 and -.21, rather than the corresponding 
values in Table 3 of .48 and .06.    12
dramatically lead fluctuations in hours.  For both labor productivity and TFP the 
correlation at a lead of 2 years is over .5.   
With sticky wages, but endogenous effort, an unexpected increase in prices 
reduces the real wage, causing a decrease in effort and TFP.  It is well known that price 
and TFP are strongly negatively correlated in the data.  For instance, Figure 2a shows the 
impulse responses from a bivariate VAR of inflation and TFP growth rate for the period 
1960-1996.  The number of lags included equals 2 (representing 2 years).  The VAR is 
structured with inflation entering first in the ordering.  TFP responds to a 1 percent 
increase in inflation by decreasing initially by about .25 percent and by even more in the 
following year.  However, the response of TFP to inflation does not clearly capture the 
relation between nominal shocks and effort if there are important cyclical shocks to 
technology.  The negative impact of productivity shocks on prices might create a negative 
association between inflation and TFP even if effort does not vary.   
Ideally, we would like to isolate the response of TFP to innovations in inflation 
due solely to exogenous monetary shocks.  Figure 2b repeats the VAR presented in Figure 
2a, but replacing the rate of inflation with our instrumented monetary shocks.  (See 
Section 3.)  TFP responds to a 1 percent increase in (instrumented) money growth by 
decreasing quite dramatically by about .6 and .4 percent in the first two years.
8  Thus TFP 
declines even more dramatically in response to a monetary innovation than to the rate of 
inflation.  This result is clearly anticipated by our model with endogenous effort, but not 
by the flexible wage or standard sticky-wage model. 
 
Impulse responses for the models 
 We examine impulse responses to technology, preference and monetary shocks for 
each of the three models.
9  First consider a technology shock of one percent.  As the 
responses of the models to technology shock are well known, we describe them briefly 
here.  In the flexible wage model with constant effort, investment responds much more 
                                                 
8  The results in Figure 2a and 2b are qualitatively robust to reordering the variables.   
9 Recall that for each model, the persistence of shocks corresponds to the autocorrelation of the shocks 
estimated from that model.  In practice, the differences in persistence of shocks across models is very 
similar; so this has little impact on the appearance of the impulse responses.   13
than consumption and output, with consumption’s response being humped shape.  In 
response to a one percent increase in  t A , investment and output increase by slightly more 
than 3 percent and one percent, respectively, in the first period. The real wage (and labor 
productivity) responds much more, and much more persistently, than hours.
10  The initial 
increase of real wage and hours are slightly less than one percent and 0.4 percent, 
respectively. Price falls by 0.5 percent from its steady state in the first period. 
For a sticky-wage model with no response in effort (g = 0), for the first year, 
during which the nominal wage is predetermined, the impact on the real wage is simply the 
opposite of the response of the price level.  The price level falls by about 2/3 of a percent.  
The induced increase in the real wage of 2/3 of a percent is somewhat smaller than the real 
wage increase under flexible wages of about 0.9 percent.  Because employment is demand 
determined, this leads to a much larger increase in employment and output in the first year.  
 The response of the model with sticky wages but endogenous effort is intermediate 
to the flexible-wage and standard sticky-wage results. The path for the real wage looks 
much like the simple sticky wage model.  The sticky nominal wage causes the real wage to 
increase by less than its flexible wage counterpart.  This leads to a reduction in the 
productivity of effort (
g ft ) by 0.4 percent in the first year.  Hours increase by about 0.8 
percent, which is greater than the response of 0.4 percent under flexible wages and smaller 
than the response of 1.2 percent under the standard sticky model.  However, the 
expansions in output, consumption, and investment look very much like that under 
completely flexible wages. 
 Next we examine the responses of these economies to a preference shock 
reflecting a one-percent increase in  t q .  The responses of the flexible wage economy are 
given in Figure 3a.  The preference shock causes both consumption and investment to 
expand, with the increase in investment modestly larger.  Output expands by about 1 
percent in the first year, declining gradually to be about 0.5 percent above trend in the fifth 
                                                 
10 We also examined a flexible-wage model with endogenous effort.  Effort moves very little.  Burnside, 
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993) and Bils and Cho (1994) achieve greater movements in effort under 
flexible wages by adding adjustment costs for hours.   14
year.  Prices and real wages are countercyclical.  Prices fall by 0.7 percent in the first year.  
Real wages fall by about 0.5 percent initially, but only slightly by the fifth year.   
 The response of the standard sticky-wage model to the preference shock, an 
increase in consumption demand, is quite perverse.  Looking at Figure 3b, the increase in 
consumption drives up the demand for real balances causing prices to drop.  This, in turn, 
increases the real wage by about 0.2 percent in the first year.  Because the level of 
technology and the capital stock are unaffected in the first year, this increase in the real 
wage necessarily generates a fall in employment and output.  So an increase in demand for 
consumption actually results in a contraction in output in the first year, with the increase in 
consumption more than offset by a significant drop in investment.  As nominal wages 
adjust investment and output subsequently increase. 
 Again the response of the sticky wage model with effort - Figure 3c - is 
intermediate to the other two models.  The real wage rises initially, similarly to the simple 
sticky wage model.  But this induces an increase in productive effort at work that 
increases the marginal product of labor.  This increase in effort exceeds the increase in real 
wage and results in an expansion in hours.  The increase in hours in the first year is 
substantially less than for the flexible wage model.  But thanks to the increase in effort, 
output expands nearly as much as under flexible wages.  Note that hours and output both 
peak in the second year of the shock, with hours in particular showing a very strong 
humped shape response.  Furthermore, real wages (and labor productivity) and TFP 
clearly lead the expansion in hours and output.  By the time hours peak, TFP is back to 
normal and the real wage and labor productivity are below trend.  The response of the 
model with sticky wages and endogenous effort to a preference shock is the only example 
of an impulse response, among the three models and three shocks we consider, that 
generates productivity leading hours.
11  From Table 3, this is a striking feature of the data. 
                                                 
11 The models in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993) and Bils and Cho (1994) generate 
productivity leading hours thanks to important short-run adjustment costs for employment, despite 
complete wage flexibility.  In many respects, however, our predictions differ sharply from those models.  
We predict a short-run decrease in effort in response to a favorable technology shock, whereas those 
models predict an increase.  Most obviously contrasting with our results, those models, given flexible 
wages, predict no (or essentially no) response in hours or effort to monetary shocks.   15
 Lastly we examine responses to a shock of one percent to the monetary growth 
rate.  The impact on the economy with flexible wages is extremely small (no real variable 
departs as much as .001 percent from its steady-state value), so we skip to the two sticky 
wage models.
12  Results for the sticky wage model without effort response appear in 
Figure 4a.  The impact on hours and output is very dramatic.  The decline in real wages 
induces a transitory increase in hours of 4 percent and in output of 2.5 percent.  The 
expansion is almost entirely through investment, which increases by about 8 percent.  The 
monetary shock creates a persistent expansion in consumption, but not in output. 
 With endogenous effort, Figure 4b, the impact of the monetary shock is almost 
neutralized by the decrease in effort brought about by the decrease in the real wage.  
Hours still expand significantly by about 2 percent, as opposed to 4 percent.  But this 
increase in hours is largely offset by a decline in effort so that the increase of effective 
labor in the market is very small.  The impact on consumption, investment, and output is 
also small relative to the case of sticky wages with no effort response.  The fall in effort 
created by the 1 percent monetary shock translates into a one-period drop in TFP of a 
little more than 0.6 percent.  This is in the direction, and of similar magnitude, that we find 
for a VAR estimated on U.S. data, as reported above. 
 
Cyclical moments for the models 
We now compare the moments for time series generated from each of the three 
models to those reported for U.S. data in Table 2 and 3.  Both data and the generated 
series are H-P filtered.  The shocks to the models consist of the technology, preference, 
and monetary shocks estimated under each model, as described in the appendix. 
Results for the flexible wage model are contained in Tables 4a and 4b.  The model 
generates fluctuations in output and hours that are respectively 0.82 and 0.77 times the 
size of those observed in the data. The model generates slightly less persistent movements 
in real variables than exhibited by the data. The model generates much less persistent 
movements in prices than we see in the data.  This statement holds for the other models 
                                                 
12 None of the models we consider in the paper generates the liquidity effect in nominal interest from 
money supply, as we do not impose any friction other than nominal-wage rigidity in the labor market.   16
we consider as well.  From Table 4b we see that the model generates contemporaneous 
correlations of labor productivity and TFP with hours of respectively .01 and .47.  These 
are quite close to those estimated for U.S. data (.06 and .45).  For the model movements 
in labor productivity and TFP modestly lag movements in hours. However, in the data, as 
discussed in the text, they very strongly lead hours.  
Results under sticky wages and constant effort appear in Tables 5a and 5b.  Hours 
are more variable for the model than in the data.  The sticky-wage model, even augmented 
with technology and preference shocks, fails to produce the observed persistence of 
economic time series.  This is particularly true for hours, which display a first-order 
correlation of .53 in the data but only .08 for the sticky wage model. (This problem is well 
known in the literature.  For a recent discussion see Chari, et. al., 2000.)  From Table 5b, 
the correlation between TFP and hours is .28.  Unlike the data, hours and labor 
productivity are quite negatively correlated, with a correlation of -.41 compared to .06 for 
the data.  Fluctuations in TFP do lead fluctuations in hours as in the data.   
 Finally, we present results for the model with sticky wages but varying effort in 
Tables 6a and 6b.  Broadly speaking, the time-series properties of key macro variables 
such as output, consumption, investment and hours from this model are similar to those of 
the flexible wage model.  Output is a bit more volatile than for the flexible wage model, 
and therefore closer to the volatility depicted in Table 3 for the U.S. economy.  Looking at 
Table 6b, the model generates a contemporaneous correlation between hours and labor 
productivity of -.13 and between hours and TFP of .21.  Both correlations fall below 
those for the flexible wage model and below those for the data.  However, this model does 
exhibit fluctuations in labor productivity and TFP that significantly lead those in hours 
worked.
13  This is a significant improvement over the flexible-wage results in Table 5b. 
                                                 
13 The finding that TFP leads hours under sticky wages partly reflects the positive covariance between 
preference and productivity shocks.   In particular, if we set the covariance of the two real shocks equal to 
zero, then productivity does not lead hours under sticky wages with constant effort.  Consumption 
increases in response to an increase in q, causing prices to decrease.  With a sticky wage this initially 
increases the real wage and, under constant effort, decreases hours.  But this is transitory; hours expand 
after nominal wages can respond—see Figure 3b.  If the preference shock is positively correlated with the 
technology shock then TFP leads hours.  TFP goes up due to the technology shock.  The delayed response 
in hours reflects the preference shock.  These effects are relevant, but less important, for our sticky-wage   17
In sum, allowing for an effort response substantially improves how well a sticky-
wage model matches the major features of U.S. business cycles.  In particular, fluctuations 
in hours become much more persistent (as in the data); and the correlation between 
fluctuations in hours and labor productivity also becomes much closer to that observed for 
the data.  Contrasts with the flexible-wage model are less striking.  The sticky-wage with 






We examine the impact of wage stickiness allowing a response in effort as well as 
hours. Sticky wages do create inefficient fluctuations in exertion at work relative to at 
home.  But, because the labor market still clears, the consumption-leisure margin is much 
less distorted than if no response in effort is allowed.  The impact of the sticky wage on 
hours worked is largely offset by variations in effort at work.   
As a result, when we compare our model quantitatively to two models without an 
effort margin, one with flexible wages and one with sticky wages, we find output and 
consumption behave much like in the flexible-wage economy.  Unlike the flexible wage 
                                                                                                                                            
model with an effort response.  With responses in effort, productivity leads hours even if the covariance 
between the two real shocks is zero, though this effect is less striking. 
14 We also explore different specifications by varying g and the steady-state ratio of effort between the 
market and at home, 
f
f
~ , around their benchmark values.  We consider the two added cases g = 1/6 and g 
= ½, while holding 
f
f
~  at its benchmark value of 1.5.  A lower g implies less substitutability between hours 
and effort in the market production, resulting in a slightly higher volatility and less persistence in hours 
and output.  We also consider two added cases setting 
f
f
~ = 1 and 
f
f




~  creates a further asymmetry between market and non-market activity in terms of substitutability 




approaches 1, the volatility and persistence of the sticky-wage with endogenous economy become very 
similar to those of flexible wage economy.  In fact, one can show that to a first order approximation, 
movements in effort offset those of hours when 
f
f
~ =1.  Yet, labor productivity and TFP continue to 
strongly lead hours of work under the sticky wage model with endogenous effort in all cases we consider.     18
model, however, our model can produce productivity that strongly leads hours over the 
cycle, as observed in the data.  Allowing for an effort response significantly improves the 
ability of a sticky-wage model to match features of actual business cycles.  Movements in 
hours and output become more persistent, as in the data.  It eliminates the counterfactual 
prediction of the sticky-wage model that productivity and hours are negatively correlated.  
It also eliminates the sticky-wage model’s odd result that a shock that increases 
consumption demand causes output to contract.  Finally, the model with sticky-wages and 
varying effort is the only one considered that generates a decline in TFP in response to a 
positive nominal shock, as we find for U.S. data.   
   19
Appendix: Estimating the Models’ Shocks:   
 
 The three disturbances to technology, preferences, and the rate of money growth 
are described by equations (12) and (13) of the text. 
 As discussed in the text, with variable effort the Solow residual reflects variations 
in effort as well as technology t A ˆ ,    
      A N K Y t t t t t f ag a a ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ + = - - - .   
Wage setting in equation (11) yields an implied value for  1 ˆ
+ t t E f .  Intuitively,  1 + t W  is set 













- .  For  l g „  
this implies small movements in  1 ˆ
+ t t E f  to satisfy energy constraint (1).  We subtract 
ag 1 ˆ
+ t t E f  from the Solow residual at time t+1 to yield a variable with expectation at time t 
equal to t A t t A A E ˆ ˆ
1 r = + .  We construct the expectation of the corrected t+1 Solow residual 
based on a projection on variables { 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
- - t t t t N N Y Y ,  1 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ












W } to obtain 
1 ˆ
+ t tA E .  We then estimate  A r ˆ  from the first-order autocorrelation of  1 ˆ
+ t tA E , which equals 
the autocorrelation of  t A ˆ .  Finally, we divide  ) ˆ ( ˆ
1 t A t t A A E r = + by  A r ˆ  to obtain our time 
series for t A ˆ . 
 Under flexible wages preference shifts, qt, can be related to hours worked and 


















q .  With the sticky wage choice for  1 + t W  in equation (11), this same 
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V .  Taking expectations of a log-linear approximation yields  
] ) ( ˆ ~ ˆ
1
[ ) 1 ( ˆ
1
ˆ
1 1 1 + + + + - +
-
- = t P
W
t t t t t c n
n
n
E E q q .  




- = t t t E q r q q .  We use predicted values 
from regressing  1 ˆ
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W } to 
obtain ] ˆ [ 1 + t t E q .  Similarly to the treatment of  t A ˆ , we use the first-order autocorrelation of 
] ˆ [ 1 + t t E q  to estimate  q r , then divide  ] ˆ [ 1 + t t E q  by  q r  to obtain a series for  t q ˆ .  (We 
proceed in a similar manner for the model with sticky wages but no effort choice.)   
Our monetary measure is based on calibrating nominal money demand and 
imposing, as is standard, that money supply equals demand.  We then instrument for this 
variable with innovations to monetary policy.  This is discussed in Section 3 of the text.  It 
is well known that given the estimated growth rate of any monetary aggregate, stochastic 
general equilibrium models generate nominal variables that are far more volatile than the 
data.  We find that, for all three models considered, our measure of money also leads to 
far more volatility in prices than we see in the data.  For this reason, we scale down the   20
monetary disturbances to half their estimated size to make the volatility of price closer to 
that in the data.  
Given the series for  } ˆ , ˆ , ˆ { t t t A m q , the stochastic process (12)-(13) is estimated by 
OLS using annual data for the United States for 1962-1996.  Linear time trends are 
included.  Estimates for r and Q are as follows (with the monetary innovation scaled to 
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Table 1 - Parameter Values for the Benchmark Case 
Parameters  Description 
a = 2/3  Labor share in output 
b = 0.98  Discount factor  
d = 0.1  Depreciation rate  
g = 0.02  Growth rate of technological progress 
x = 1  Labor supply elasticity 
n = 0.5  Steady-state hours of work 
g = 1/3  Ability to substitute hours and effort in the market 
l = 1/ 4  Ability to substitute hours and effort at home 
u = .1  Interest rate elasticity of money demand 
c = .9999  Relative share of consumption in utility 
q = 0.6332  Steady-state value in preference 
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Table 2 - Volatility, persistence, and cyclicality: U.S. time series 1954-1996
 #  
Variable (x)  sx  sx / soutput  cor(xt, xt-1)  cor(x, output) 
Output   2.29  1.00  .57  1.00 
Consumption  1.32   .58  .67   .88 
Investment  6.39  2.79  .41   .83 
Hours   2.01   .88  .53   .91 
Price   .97   .42  .81  -.57 
Real wage    .94   .44  .48   .49 
Labor productivity    .97   .42  .46   .48 
Solow residual    1.29   .57  .45   .82 
 
Table 3 - Lead and Lag correlations with hours at t 
Variable (x)  x(t-3)  x(t-2)  x(t-1)  x(t)  x(t+1)  x(t+2)  X(t+3) 
Real wage   -.28  -.01  .38  .43  -.09  -.36  -.28 
Labor productivity   .14  .54  .65  .06  -.38  -.23  -.14 
Solow residual   .16  .51  .76  .45  -.28  -.46  -.39 
 
                                                 
# Output: real GDP.  Consumption: expenditure on non-durables and services.  Investment: fixed 
investment.  Hours: employed man-hours.  Real wage: average hourly earning.  Labor productivity: output 
divided by hours.  Quantities are divided by population of age over 20.  All variables are annual and H-P 
filtered with the weight parameter 100.  
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Table 4a - Volatility, persistence, and cyclicality: Flexible wages 
Variable (x)  sx  sx / soutput   cor(xt, xt-1)  cor(x, output) 
Output   1.87  1.00   .41  1.00 
Consumption  1.15   .61   .51   .92 
Investment  4.07  2.17   .37   .96 
Hours   1.55   .83   .38   .83 
Price   1.22   .65   .51  -.90 
Labor productivity   1.03   .55   .45   .55 
TFP    1.14   .61   .38   .86 
 
 
Table 4b - Lead and lag correlations with hours at t: Flexible wages 
Variable (x)  x(t-3)  x(t-2)  x(t-1)  x(t)  x(t+1)  x(t+2)  x(t+3) 
Labor productivity  -.12  -.12  -.09   .01   .12   .13   .11 
TFP  -.11  -.02  .16   .47   .19   .02   -.07 
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Table 5a - Volatility, persistence, and cyclicality: Sticky wages & constant effort 
Variable (x)  sx  sx / soutput   cor(xt, xt-1)  cor(x, output) 
Output   2.07  1.00   .35  1.00 
Consumption  1.10   .53   .53   .71 
Investment  5.60  2.70   .11   .94 
Hours   2.26  1.09   .08   .84 
Price   1.21   .58   .51  -.69 
Labor productivity   1.22   .59   .10   .13 
TFP    1.41   .55   .37   .73 
 
 
Table 5b - Lead and lag correlations with hours at t: Sticky wages & constant effort 
Variable (x)  x(t-3)  x(t-2)  x(t-1)  x(t)  x(t+1)  x(t+2)  x(t+3) 
Labor productivity  -.02   .09   .25  -.41  .12   .11   .06 
TFP  -.06   .13   .41   .28  .07  -.05  -.12 
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Table 6a - Volatility, persistence, and cyclicality: Sticky wages & effort response 
Variable (x)  sx  sx / soutput   cor(xt, xt-1)  cor(x, output) 
Output   1.90  1.00   .40  1.00 
Consumption  1.20   .63   .48   .91 
Investment  4.07  2.14   .35   .95 
Hours   1.51   .79   .38   .68 
Price   1.32   .69   .48  -.89 
Labor productivity   1.36   .72   .04   .61 
TFP    1.41   .74   .14   .83 
 
 
Table 6b - Lead and lag correlations with hours at t: Sticky wages & effort response 
Variable (x)  x(t-3)  x(t-2)  x(t-1)  x(t)  x(t+1)  x(t+2)  x(t+3) 
Labor productivity  -.00  .12  .34  -.13  -.09   -.02   .02 
TFP  -.01  .18  .52   .21   -.04  -.12  -.12 
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Figure 3a Impulse response to 1% increase in preference shock: flexible wage 
 
 




Figure 3b Impulse response to 1% increase in preference shock: sticky wage 
 
 




Figure 3c Impulse response to 1% increase in preference shock: sticky wage with effort 
 
 




Figure 4a Impulse response to 1% increase in money growth: sticky wage 
 
 




Figure 4b Impulse response to 1% increase in money growth: sticky wage with effort 
 
 
 
 